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ERSONAL torts is an area of law that closely affects all Texans.
The very word personal means "of, relating to, or affecting a per-
son."' The word tort means "wrongful act for which a civil action
will lie . .. *"2 Personal torts therefore, to exist, must have two compo-
nents. First, they must relate to or affect a person. Second, a cause of
action must lie in civil court as a result of the conduct of the defendant.
Very little argument exists regarding whether certain conduct relates to
or affects a person. The arguments in Texas courts increasingly center
around whether our system of justice is going to allow a civil action to lie
in an effort to deter unreasonable conduct and compensate the personal
injuries such conduct inflicts.
The first issue in addressing personal torts is whether a tort has oc-
curred at all, meaning whether our society is going to recognize a cause of
action for the questioned conduct. If there is no cause of action, there is
no tort. Whether a duty exists to control ones conduct, duty meaning a
legal duty, so that it does not adversely affect another person is a ques-
tion raised often in today's Texas Court System. The cases clearly indi-
cate that in Texas, a general duty to be careful and reasonable is
disappearing in favor of a more rigid and confined set of duties. The
Texas Supreme Court's efforts at "judicial codification" narrowing the
duties owed by Texans to one another means that fewer personal torts
exist now than in the past. The clear winners in this binge of judicial
legislation eliminating well established common law duties on a case by
case basis, and thereby personal torts, are the persons factually, but not
legally, responsible for harming their fellow citizens. Reducing the num-
ber of persons injured by tortuous conduct through eliminating torts is
the equivalent of reducing crime by eliminating criminal statutes.
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A. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP AND ON-CALL SPECIALISTS
In Majzoub v. Appling,3 the Houston [First District] Court of Appeals
determined that since the defendant had not taken any affirmative action
in treating the plaintiff, there was not a physician-patient relationship. 4
Hassan El Majzoub went to the Rosewood Medical Center emergency
room on September 17, 1997, complaining that he could not breathe. The
emergency room physician's physical examination of Majzoub "revealed
swollen lymph nodes, inflammation of the pharynx, enlarged, swollen
tonsils covered with pus-like exudate, and a muffled, hoarse voice. ' 5
Majzoub also had stridor, which is a high-pitched voice caused by block-
age of the larynx. After examining Majzoub, the ER physician asked a
nurse to call the on-call otolaryngologist, the defendant Dr. Appling.
Dr. Appling returned the telephone call and spoke to the ER physi-
cian. During this telephone call, Dr. Appling discussed Majzoub's symp-
toms in detail with the ER physician and made recommendations.
The ER physician reported that Majzoub had tested positive for strep
and that "he had large, inflamed tonsils that were almost touching."'6 Dr.
Appling then instructed the ER physician to give Majzoub a shot of peni-
cillin and a breathing treatment. The ER physician reported that he had
already done those things, and Dr. Appling replied, "Well, what we nor-
mally do with our patients is to give them a gram of Rocephin ... and
give them Dalalone .... "7 Dr. Appling also told the ER physician to give
"an additional shot of the other antibiotic" and "observe the patient, es-
pecially after giving him the shot and the breathing treatment," for
"thirty minutes to an hour."8 Dr. Appling then concluded the call by
instructing the ER physician to call him back if anything changed and to
also call after Majzoub finished the breathing treatment and "let me
know how he's doing."9
Early the next morning, the ER physician called Dr. Appling to say
that he was going to refer Majzoub to Dr. Appling for follow-up treat-
ment. Dr. Appling agreed and instructed the ER physician to have
Majzoub call and make an appointment for that morning. That appoint-
ment, however, never happened. Later that same morning, Majzoub suf-
fered a respiratory arrest that left him brain dead.
Majzoub's widow sued Dr. Appling for medical malpractice, and the
trial court granted Dr. Appling summary judgment on the grounds that
there was no physician-patient relationship, and thus no duty on the part
3. Majzoub v. Appling, 95 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.
h.).
4. Id. at 438.
5. Id. at 434.
6. Id.





of Dr. Appling to treat Majzoub.' 0 The court of appeals then affirmed
the trial court in a decision that seems to lack sound legal reasoning.
The elements of a medical malpractice case are firmly established.
"[A] plaintiff must prove there was (1) a duty to conform to a particular
standard of care, (2) a breach of that standard, (3) resultant injury, and
(4) a causal connection between the breach of the standard and the in-
jury."" The existence of a duty is a question of law,' 2 and a physician
cannot be liable for medical malpractice unless the physician breaches a
duty flowing from a physician-patient relationship.' 3
The Plaintiff's argument in Majzoub that there was a physician-patient
relationship is compelling:
[A]lthough Dr. Appling never saw, talked to, or examined Majzoub
before the anoxic brain injury, the recommendations Dr. Appling
made to [the ER physician] on the telephone, his request to be up-
dated on Majzoub's condition, and his consent to try to see Majzoub
in his office the following day establish[] the existence of a physi-
cian-patient relationship. * * * Dr. Appling took affirmative action
when he listened to [the ER physician's] recitation of Majzoub's
symptoms and suggested treatment in the form of additional medica-
tion, and when he requested that he be called and updated on
Majzoub's status following the completion of the breathing
treatments.14
In St. John v. Pope,'5 the Texas Supreme Court stated, "Creation of the
physician-patient relationship does not require the formalities of a con-
tract. The fact that a physician does not deal directly with a patient does
not necessarily preclude the existence of a physician-patient relation-
ship.' 6 A physician-patient relationship may be established at the ex-
press or implied consent of the physician.17 While consent may be
implied, the "on-call" status of a physician does not automatically impose
10. Id. at 436.
11. Id. (citing Wax v. Johnson, 42 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2001, pet. denied)).
12. St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. 1995).
13. Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 38 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
14. Majzoub, 95 S.W.3d at 437.
15. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 420.
16. Id. at 424; see also Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, no writ) (holding that a physician-patient relationship existed between patient
from whom biopsy was taken and doctors who examined tissue from biopsy and negli-
gently misdiagnosed malignant cancer); Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 147-48
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding a genuine issue of fact about whether physician-patient rela-
tionship between physicians who provided the service to the hospital of determining
whether patients were "candidates" for angioplasty procedure and those patients, even
though the physicians never examined the patients); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i,
§ 1.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003) (defining "Health care" as "any act or treatment performed or
furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider
for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or
confinement").
17. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 423.
20031 1887
SMU LAW REVIEW
a duty.'8 The physician may, however, create one if there is some affirm-
ative action on his or her part.19 There is no need to have direct physical
contact with a patient in order to establish that relationship.20
Both St. John and the case relied upon by Dr. Appling, Lopez v.
Aziz, 2' demonstrate that Majzoub is a case such as those referred to by
the Supreme Court in St. John, where an on-call physician may establish a
physician-patient relationship by implied consent. In Majzoub, an ER
physician called an on-call specialist in the same area in which the patient
was having symptoms. Dr. Appling listened to the patient's symptoms,
gave instructions to the ER physician, which the ER physician followed,
and planned a follow-up examination. The ER physician was clearly act-
ing beyond the scope of his own qualifications and relying on Dr. Ap-
pling's instructions. As he stated in his deposition, he was not
comfortable making the decisions as to Majzoub's care on his own and
therefore consulted a specialist in that particular area.22
In St. John, the patient was presented to an ER physician at Central
Texas Medical Center with a backache and fever after undergoing back
surgery and epidural injections. The ER physician called the on-call in-
ternist, Dr. St. John, and told him of the patient's symptoms. However,
"[b]ecause St. John's area of specialization was not neurology or neuro-
surgery, and the [Medical] Center was not able to handle cases involving
these specialties, St. John recommended that Pope be referred to a hospi-
tal with the requisite neurosurgeon or to the physician who had per-
formed the surgery. '23 That was the extent of Dr. St. John's involvement,
and the supreme court correctly held that there was not a physician-pa-
tient relationship. Unlike Dr. Appling, Dr. St. John never recommended
specific drug treatment, interventional breathing treatment or instructed
that he be contacted at a later time.
The Lopez decision,2 4 relied upon by the Houston [First District] Court
of Appeals did not address the duties of an on-call specialist. In Lopez,
the decedent was suffering from pre-eclampsia, which is toxemia of late
pregnancy, prior to delivery of her eleventh child. The decedent's pri-
mary care physician, who was handling the decedent's care, consulted
once by telephone with an OB/GYN specialist, who simply suggested a
"complete laboratory work-up," which the primary care physician subse-
quently ordered.2 5 The Lopez court concluded that the consulted doctor
"did no more than answer the professional inquiry of a colleague. There
is no evidence of any consensual basis for the existence of a physician-
18. Id. at 424.
19. Day v. Harkins & Munoz, 961 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1997, no writ).
20. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 424.
21. Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ).
22. Majzoub, 95 S.W.3d at 435-36.
23. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 422.
24. Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 303.
25. Id. at 304.
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patient relationship arising out of that one telephone conversation. '2 6
The Majzoub family's attorney relied on a Dallas Court of Appeals
decision that is directly on point, Lection v. Dyll.27 In Lection, as in
Majzoub, an ER physician called the on-call Neurology specialist to dis-
cuss the diagnosis and treatment of a patient.28 The ER physician tele-
phoned the on-call specialist, "who had an obligation to the hospital to
assist, and not merely because [the on-call specialist] was a colleague. '29
The emergency room doctor "sought and relied upon the [on-call physi-
cian's] diagnosis and treatment plan."'30
The summary judgment record in Lection showed that the on-call phy-
sician diagnosed Lection's condition and told the ER physician that no
other treatment was necessary. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that
these statements constituted "an evaluation of the information provided
and a medical decision concerning Lection's need for treatment and ad-
mission to the hospital, and thus [were] 'affirmative acts' towards Lec-
tion's treatment. '31 The Dallas Court of Appeals then reversed summary
judgment in Dr. Dyll's favor.
The Majzoub court also ignored the decision in Wheeler v. Yettie Kerst-
ing Memorial Hospital.32 In Wheeler, a woman sued several parties for
the suffocation death of her baby during a negligent delivery by emer-
gency medical technicians ("EMTs") who were transporting her ninety
miles to Galveston. 33 Before transporting Wheeler, the EMTs took her
to Yettie Kersting Memorial Hospital, the nearest medical facility, for an
assessment to determine whether they could safely transport Wheeler to
Galveston. A nurse at Yettie Kersting contacted an on-call physician, Dr.
Rodriguez. The nurse gave Dr. Rodriguez medical information about
Wheeler, and Dr. Rodriguez approved the transfer. In the subsequent
lawsuit, Dr. Rodriquez argued that there was not a physician-patient rela-
tionship because he had no duty to give Wheeler care.
In rejecting Dr. Rodriguez's argument, the Houston [First District]
Court of Appeals observed that the question was "whether Dr. Rodri-
guez actually rendered services to Mrs. Wheeler, thus establishing a phy-
sician-patient relationship. '34 While Dr. Rodriguez was not requested to
examine Wheeler, nor did he actually do so, he was requested to "evalu-
ate certain information and make a medical decision whether Mrs.
Wheeler could safely be transferred to [Galveston]. '35 Thus, the court of
appeals concluded that "in evaluating the status of Mrs. Wheeler's labor
and giving his approval, [Dr. Rodriguez] established a doctor-patient re-
26. Id. at 306.
27. Lection v. Dyll, 65 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).




32. Wheeler, 866 S.W.2d 32.
33. Id. at 35-36.




lationship with Mrs. Wheeler and accepted the duties which flow from
such a relationship. '" 36
The reasoning behind the Lection and Wheeler decisions fits squarely
with the facts of Majzoub. ER physicians are not qualified to deal with
every condition presented in the emergency room. Hospitals therefore
have specialists on call for the ER physicians to contact for guidance on
conditions beyond their knowledge and capability. Hasan El Majzoub
was presented to the emergency room with a critical otolaryngological
condition. The ER physician did not feel qualified to make decisions con-
cerning Majzoub's care alone and contacted the on-call otolaryngologist,
Dr. Appling. He then relayed Majzoub's symptoms to Dr. Appling for
the purpose of diagnosis and treatment. Dr. Appling knew that the ER
physician was not qualified to treat Majzoub on his own and expected the
ER physician to follow his instructions, which the ER physician did. As
in Lection, Dr. Appling made an evaluation of the information provided
and a medical decision. 37 A physician-patient relationship existed.
B. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP CREATING A DUTY TO CONTROL THE
ACTIVITIES OF A MINOR
In Texas Home Management, Inc. v. Peavy,38 Anthony Tyrone Dixon
was committed to the custody of a county mental health authority, which
placed the juvenile in Texas Home Management's ("THM") intermediate
care facility, Lakewood House, near Nacogdoches. While in Lakewood
House and during his approved trips home to see his mother in Houston,
Dixon frequently engaged in serious criminal activity. During a visit to
his mother, Dixon shot and killed Edith and O.L. Peavy's daughter. The
Peavys filed suit claiming that THM negligently failed to supervise and
control Dixon. The trial court granted THM summary judgment, and the
intermediate appellate court affirmed.39 The Texas Supreme Court cor-
rectly reversed, holding that THM had sufficient control over Dixon to
create a special relationship between THM and Dixon that created a duty
to properly supervise Dixon's activities.40 The outrageous nature of the
conduct at issue no doubt played a role in the decision.
The facts recited by the supreme court reveal that Dixon was certainly
a danger to society. He assaulted other residents at Lakewood House
and seven other students at school. When Dixon went home to Houston,
his behavior was worse-two burglaries, an aggravated assault, shoplift-
ing, two unauthorized uses of motor vehicles, and a high-speed chase.
The Texas Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rodriguez, stated
that:
36. Id. at 40.
37. Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 714-15.
38. Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2002).




[tihe question of legal duty is a multifaceted issue requiring us to
balance a number of factors such as the risk and foreseeability of
injury, the social utility of the actor's conduct, the consequences of
imposing the burden on the actor, and any other relevant competing
individual and social interests implicated by the facts of the case.41
The supreme court then noted a duty may arise to control the actions
of another if there is (1) a special relationship between the parties, (2) a
reasonable foreseeability of harm to the injured person, and (3) public
policy reasons that favor holding the actor liable. 42
Dixon had been placed in Lakewood House due to extreme behavioral
problems, including criminal and violent conduct. THM's contract with
the state required THM to "train, treat, care for, and control Dixon.' '43
The Peavys asserted that THM was negligent for allowing Dixon to con-
tinue his trips home to Houston, despite his numerous assaults at Lake-
wood House and school and his criminal activity while in Houston.
THM countered that it had limited authority to control Dixon because
he was a ward of the state and both state and federal regulations en-
courage home visitation. 44 While federal and state regulations en-
couraged juveniles to have frequent visits with their mothers, such visits
were not required. THM employees had approved Dixon's visits. The
regulations THM contracted to follow gave THM the right to control
Dixon and imposed a duty to plan for his training and treatment. Thus,
the court concluded that a special relationship existed.45
THM should have foreseen the danger in allowing Dixon to visit his
mother and stopped the visits. 46 "Dixon was involved in nineteen as-
saults, seven other instances of criminal conduct, and nine incidents of
verbal threats while he resided at Lakewood House. '47 The risk of Dixon
to harm others was clearly foreseeable.
Lastly, the supreme court examined the public policy reasons for hold-
ing THM liable. While noting the importance of integrating the mentally
retarded into society, the court also found that there "is also an important
interest in protecting the public from dangerous individuals who are al-
ready subject to the state's supervision and control. '48
After considering the existence of a special relationship, the foresee-
ability of the harm, and public policy considerations, the court concluded
that THM failed to "establish as a matter of law that it had no duty to
reasonably exercise its right to control Dixon. '49 The case is an excellent
41. Id. at 33 (citing Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983).
42. Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 483.420(c)(5); 16 TEX. REG. 3525, 3527).
45. Texas Home Mgmt., Inc., 89 S.W.3d at 34-35.
46. Id. at 39.
47. Id. at 37.




example of a straight forward application of clearly established legal
principles.
C. RECREATIONAL USE STATUTE
In City of Bellmead v. Torres,50 Nanette Torres and her husband sued
the City of Bellmead for injuries that Nanette suffered when a swing in a
city park broke. Torres alleged that she was injured due to "a condition
or use of personal or real property," and thus alleged waiver of immunity
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 51 The issue was whether the Texas Rec-
reational Use Statute52 absolved the city of liability.
The Texas Recreational Use Statute states:
If an owner, lessee, or occupant of real property other than agricul-
tural land gives permission to another to enter the premises for rec-
reation, the owner, lessee, or occupant, by giving the permission,
does not:
(1) assure that the premises are safe for that purpose;
(2) owe to the person to whom permission is granted a greater
degree of care than is owed to a trespasser on the premises; or
(3) assume responsibility or incur liability for any injury to any
individual or property caused by any act of the person to whom
permission is granted.53
Property owners are not liable for trespassers' injuries so long as the
owner did not engage in grossly negligent conduct or act with malicious
intent or in bad faith. 54 Since the court concluded that swinging is a rec-
reational activity and there was no evidence that the city acted willfully,
wantonly, or was grossly negligent, the city was entitled to summary
judgment.
Justice Hankinson dissented. At the time that Torres was injured, the
Texas Recreational Use Statute defined recreation with a list of several
specific activities.55 These included "hunting, fishing, swimming, boating,
camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing
and water sports."' 56 While this list is not meant to be exhaustive, the
majority merely concluded that "sitting on a swing is the type of activity
that the [Texas] Legislature intended to include as recreation when they
enacted the Statute. ' 57 Justice Hankinson pointed out that the majority
"cites no evidence ... to support its conclusion. '58 And while four inter-
mediate courts of appeal had also concluded that swinging is "recreation"
50. City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. 2002).
51. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1997).
52. Id. § 75.002(c)(1)-(3).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Torres, 89 S.W.3d at 612.
55. Id. at 616.
56. Id. at 616-17.
57. Id. at 614-15.
58. Id. at 616 (Hankinson, J., dissenting).
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as defined under the statute,5 9 Justice Hankinson pointed out that these
courts merely made the same conclusory statement that the Texas Su-
preme Court was making in Torres. Instead of making conclusory state-
ments, Justice Hankinson argued that the court "should discern the
common characteristics among the activities on the list, and then deter-
mine if swinging shares those characteristics, keeping in mind the history
and purpose of the statute. '60 Justice Hankinson then made a well-rea-
soned analysis that left little doubt that swinging was not, in fact, a form
of "recreation" as contemplated by the Texas Recreational Use Statute.
The Legislature originally passed the Texas Recreational Use Statute in
1965, and it originally protected landowners when they allowed others to
enter their property to hunt, fish, and camp.61 The Legislature added
swimming, boating, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study,
water skiing, and water sports in 1981.62 It later added "cave explora-
tion," "bird watching," and skating in municipal parks. The "text and
history" of the statute demonstrate that the legislative intent "is to en-
courage [private] landowners to allow the public to enjoy outdoor recrea-
tion on the landowner's property by limiting the landowner's liability for
personal injury."'63 The public policy implications of this decision are
dangerous. The statute is not meant to "remov[e] parks from the list of
governmental functions for which a municipality's sovereign immunity is
waived under the Tort Claims Act, simply because parks are usually lo-
cated outdoors. ' 64 And by doing so, "the Court is making very different
policy choices from those made by the Legislature. ' 65 The decision virtu-
ally eliminates premises liability in Texas. If "recreation" means swing-
ing, it arguable also means watching football, drinking, riding a roller
coaster, attending a party, using a waterslide, jumping on a trampoline
and a myriad of other activities. Any person or entity accused of allowing
a dangerous condition to exist on their property need only now establish
that the plaintiff's purpose on the property was not for business or profes-
sional purpose.
59. Id. (citing the following cases for the following propositions: City of Lubbock v.
Rule, 68 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (concluding that using play-
ground equipment is "akin to 'picknicking' (albeit without the food)" and thus that it is an
activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors "cannot reasonably be disputed");
Flye v. City of Waco, 50 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.) (applying recre-
ational use statute to pushing a swing when plaintiffs "agree on appeal that they went to
the park to engage in activities that fall within the scope of [the statute]"); Kopplin v. City
of Garland, 869 S.W.2d 433, 441 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied) ("We conclude that
playing on playground equipment on the City's playground is a recreational activity con-
templated under [the recreational use statute]."); Martinez v. Harris County, 808 S.W.2d
257, 260 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (concluding that a "reasonable




62. Id. at 616-17.
63. Id. at 617.
64. Id. at 618 (Hankinson J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Hankinson, J., dissenting).
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C. DRAM SHOP ACT
In D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 66 Melissa Love, an exotic dancer, sued the
club where she worked claiming that the club required her to drink with
customers to increase their bar tab and then let her drive home drunk.
Love was injured after she left work at 1:00 a.m. when her car struck a
guard rail on the way home. Between 7:45 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on the
night of the accident, Love consumed twelve drinks. Her blood alcohol
level at 4:00 a.m. was still was .225, indicating that at 1:00 a.m. when she
left the club, her blood alcohol level "would have been so high that she
would have had trouble standing or walking."'67
The Texas Supreme Court held that: (1) the Dram Shop Act 68 did not
abrogate a commercial seller's common law duties as an employer to its
employees and independent contractors; 69 (2) if an employer requires its
employees or independent contractors to consume alcohol while working
in sufficient amounts to become intoxicated, the employer has a duty to
take reasonable care to prevent the employee or independent contractor
from driving when he or she leaves work; and (3) summary judgment
should not have been granted because the employer in this case failed to
negate this duty as a matter of law.7 0
In Reeder v. Daniel,7 1 the defendant, Tyler Reeder, allowed minors to
consume alcohol at a party he threw at his house while his parents were
away. One of the minors, Jeff Lawson, struck and injured another minor
at the party, Andrew Daniel. Under Texas Alcohol and Beverage Code
section 106.06, it is a criminal offense to make alcohol available to those
under twenty-one.7 2 Daniel sued Tyler Reeder under the negligence per
se doctrine for violating section 106.06. On petition for review, the Texas
Supreme Court had to decide if such action was inconsistent with legisla-
tive intent.
The Legislature comprehensively regulates alcohol, dividing the Texas
Alcoholic Beverage Code into separate criminal and civil liability sec-
tions. 73 The civil liability section contains the Dram Shop Act, creating a
civil cause of action only against commercial alcohol providers.7 4 The
Legislature specifically rejected a civil cause of action against social hosts
when it enacted section 2.03.75 The supreme court held that it would
therefore be inconsistent with legislative intent to base negligence per se
on a violation of section 106.06. For the same reasons, the court also
declined to recognize a new social-host ordinary negligence duty not to
66. D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450 (Tex. 2002).
67. Id. at 452.
68. TEX. ALCO. BEy. CODE ANN. § 2.03 (Vernon 1995).
69. Love, 92 S.W.3d at 454.
70. Id. at 457.
71. Reeder v. Daniel, 61 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. 2001).
72. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.06 (Vernon 2003).
73. Reeder, 61 S.W.3d at 363.
74. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.03 (Vernon 1995).
75. Reeder, 61 S.W.3d at 363 (citing Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1997)).
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make alcohol available to minors.76 The supreme court apparently thinks
serving minors alcohol in violation of the law at one's home is a less cul-
pable conduct that encouraging an adult stripper to drink on the job.
E. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT
In County of Cameron v. Brown,7 7 the parents of Nolan Brown sued
Cameron County, the Texas Department of Transportation, and a con-
tractor for the death of their son, who died as a result of a block of light
on the Queen Isabella Causeway failing. Nolan Brown was crossing the
causeway toward South Padre in the early morning when he lost control
of his truck. The truck struck the concrete median between the eastbound
and westbound lanes, skidded, and turned over on its side. When it came
to rest, Brown attempted to escape through the sunroof when an oncom-
ing car crashed into Brown's truck. When the accident occurred, a block
of lights on the east-bound section of the causeway was not functioning.
A county park system director had previously reported that the block of
lights was not working and called this a "serious safety hazard. '7 8
Nolan's parents argued that the dark block of lights constituted a prem-
ises defect for which the Texas Tort Claims Act waived governmental im-
munity. State agencies and counties "generally enjoy sovereign immunity
from tort liability unless immunity has been waived" under the Tort
Claims Act,7 9 which expressly waives sovereign immunity in three general
areas: "[(1)] use of publicly owned automobiles, [(2)] premises defects,
and [(3)] injuries arising out of conditions or use of property." 80 How-
ever, the Act "does not waive immunity for discretionary decisions, such
as whether and what type of safety features to provide. 81
The Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity for injury and
death caused by a condition of real property "if the governmental unit
would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to
Texas law."' 82 With respect to ordinary premises defects, the Texas Tort
Claims Act limits the governmental duty owed to a claimant to "the duty
that a private person owes to a licensee on private property." 83 "Thus, a
governmental unit may be liable for an ordinary premises defect only if a
private person would be liable to a licensee under the same circum-
stances."'84 "A property possessor must not injure a licensee by willful,
wanton, or grossly negligent conduct, and must use ordinary care either
to warn a licensee of a condition that presents an unreasonable risk of
76. Id. at 364.
77. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2002).
78. Id. at 553.
79. Id. at 554 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001(3)(A)-(B),
101.025 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2003); Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611
(Tex. 2000)).
80. Id. (quoting Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976)).
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1997)).




harm of which the possessor is actually aware and the licensee is not, or
to make the condition reasonably safe."'85
The plaintiffs' claims in County of Cameron were based upon the de-
fendants' maintenance of the causeway lighting. The majority held that
this did not concern discretionary acts, and therefore analyzed the
Brown's claim as a premises-defect claim within the Act's immunity
waiver.86
The County made several arguments on appeal. The County first ar-
gued that "it neither owned nor exercised exclusive control over the
causeway or its streetlight system, and therefore cannot be held liable for
the alleged premises defect."'8 7 The supreme court, however, noted that
"a premises-liability defendant may be held liable for a dangerous condi-
tion on the property if it 'assumed control over and responsibility for the
premises, even if it did not own or physically occupy the property." 88
"The relevant inquiry is whether the defendant assumed sufficient control
over the part of the premises that presented the alleged danger so that
the defendant had the responsibility to remedy it."89 The Browns alleged
that the County "maintained the [causeway] pursuant to a contract with
the State." 90 Furthermore, there was no dispute that the County had as-
sumed some responsibility for maintaining the causeway's lights. The
court concluded that this was adequate to allege the first element of a
premises-liability claim - that the County possessed the property. 9'
The County next argued that "the plaintiffs have not alleged a condi-
tion posing an unreasonable risk of harm because it was not foreseeable
that Brown would lose control of his vehicle and then be struck by a
motorist while attempting to exit the wreckage. '92 "A condition poses an
unreasonable risk of harm for premises-defect purposes when there is a
'sufficient probability of a harmful event occurring that a reasonably pru-
dent person would have foreseen it or some similar event as likely to
happen."' 93 Furthermore, only the general danger must be foreseeable. 94
The court agreed with the intermediate appellate court, stating that, "'the
Causeway is more dangerous than an ordinary road' upon the complete
failure of a large block of streetlights. '95
85. Id. at 554-55 (citing State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d
235, 237 (Tex. 1992)).
86. Id. at 555.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 556 (citing City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. 1986)).
89. Id. (citing Page, 701 S.W.2d at 833-34, for the holding that "the city did not assume




92. Id. at 555.
93. Id. at 556 (citing Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Assocs., 451 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.
1970)).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Brown v. State Dep't of Transp., 80 S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2000), affd, 80 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2002)).
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The causeway curves and ascends high above the water, its shoulders
are narrow, and concrete barriers prevent motorists who drive onto
it from turning around. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that it is
unforeseeable that a significant and unexpected change in lighting at
night on a narrow and curving causeway could impair a motorist's
ability to avoid obstacles that lie ahead.96
The court also noted the existence of letters from county employees that
notified the county and the Texas Department of Transportation of the
danger. These letters referred to the dark block of lights as a "serious
safety hazard." 97 The County's park system director specifically warned
about the danger to motorists "stranded in poorly lit sections" of the
causeway. 98
The defendants next claimed that "any risk of harm presented by the
alleged defect was not unreasonable when weighed against the burden
that governmental entities would face if the defendants here could be
held liable for the failed block of lighting." 99 The court, however, limited
its holding, noting that "[a] governmental unit's sovereign immunity is
not waived for failure to install lighting, which is a discretionary decision,
or even for not repairing lighting that has been installed if an unreasona-
bly dangerous condition is not thereby created."''° It limited its holding
to this particular causeway's "unique characteristics and the nature of the
particular dangerous condition alleged."'' 1
The defendants also argued that the condition of "darkness at night is
so open and obvious that knowledge of the condition must be imputed to
causeway" motorists.10 2 The court, however, noted that "the dangerous
condition alleged is not merely 'darkness' but a failed block of artificial
lighting that caused a sudden, unexpected and significant transition from
light to darkness," which "may or may not have been open and obvious
to ordinary users considering the causeway's particular characteris-
tics.1' 0 3 These "particular characteristics" were the narrowness of the
causeway, the curviness of the causeway, the causeway's height above the
bay, the existence of a cement barrier separating the two lanes in each
direction preventing drivers from turning back, and the narrowness of the
shoulder beside the traffic lanes.' 0 4 The morning of the accident, the
causeway was lit at the point of entry. It was not necessarily open and
obvious to motorists entering the causeway that the road would go dark
on a curve high above the bay.10 5
96. Id.
97. Id. at 557.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 555.
100. Id. at 557.
101. Id.






Justice Jefferson, joined by Justice Owen, wrote a concurrence in which
he parted ways with the majority for failing to articulate a "principle to
identify in future cases the characteristics that will give rise to a cause of
action within the terms of the Act.' 10 6 He argued that the "I know it
when I see it" analysis would result in too much uncertainty. The major-
ity opinion, he fears, will "inundate courts with claims against state and
local governments for what amounts to discretionary decisions involving
the design and illumination of Texas roadways." 0 7 "[D]arkness," Justice
Jefferson claims, "is not an unreasonably dangerous condition."' 10 8
The analysis of Justice Jefferson and Justice Owen is arguably flawed.
While installation of the lights was a discretionary act, the decision
whether to properly maintain the lights once installed is not. This is espe-
cially true when the state actor is subjectively aware that the failure to do
so creates a serious safety hazard. Justice Jefferson writes, however, "At
some point along every highway, streetlights end, plunging drivers into
darkness." 0 9 That darkness, however, is almost always visible from a dis-
tance and expected. In this case, motorists entering the curved and
sloped causeway had no way of knowing that they would be plunged into
darkness when they rounded the top of the bridge. Sudden darkness was
not the dangerous condition-it was sudden, unexpected darkness that
the county actually and subjectively considered a serious safety hazard
yet failed to correct-as the majority made clear.
Justice Hecht also wrote a dissent with reasoning similar to Justices
Jefferson and Owen. Unlike the judicial tone of the concurrence by Jef-
ferson and Owen, however, Justice Hecht chose a condescending tone
about the tragic death of this young man:
Assume for me, if you will, that all roadways that are dark at night
are unreasonably dangerous. This is hard, I know, since almost all of
the roadways in the world are dark at night and for that reason most
cars are equipped with headlamps. But assume that darkness at
night is unreasonably dangerous to that we can take that issue off the
table. (As an aside, I should point out that sunshine can also make a
roadway unreasonably dangerous because it gets in your eyes; but
that is not this case, and the Court wisely reserves that issue for, as it
were, another day).
Now one might say: well, that's impossible; any fool driving along
can tell by looking whether a roadway is light or dark .... By saying
that the darkness was "unexpected," I suppose the Court means that
Brown and Martinez had not anticipated as they were driving along
that the lights might be out. But when they came upon the darkness,
they surely must have thought to themselves, "Hmmm, the highway's
dark here," just as if they had come to the end of any lighted road-
106. Id. at 559 (Jefferson, J., concurring).
107. Id. (Jefferson, J., concurring).
108. Id. (Jefferson, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 560 (Jefferson, J., concurring).
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way. So however unexpected the darkness may have been, it was
still plain as day, so to speak. And when the Court says the "transi-
tion from light to darkness" was "significant," I confess I haven't a
clue what it means. The distinction between darkness that is "signifi-
cant" and plain old insignificant darkness is lost on me.
Amendment is futile unless, if they allege that Brown did not know
when he entered the causeway that some of it was not lighted, they
can prevail. Is that allegation, if proved, sufficient to make the
County liable for the darkness? Yes, says the Court. Well, then, the
County should just pay up. Unless it can prove that Brown had su-
pervision (including x-ray vision to see through the bridge) or was
clairvoyant, it can't possibly escape liability, because no one but Su-
perman and Nostradamus could possibly have know, entering the
causeway, that the lights were out ahead. 110
F. FIDUCIARY DUTY
In Herrin v. Medical Protective Co.,' Bob J. Herrin, M.D., contended
that his medical malpractice insurer, The Medical Protective Company
("Medical Protective"), promised him that his consent to a $300,000 med-
ical malpractice settlement "would not in any way affect his liability cov-
erage. '"" 2 The doctor consented to the settlement in 1995, and Medical
Protective paid the settlement in early 1996. In April 1997, Medical Pro-
tective denied Dr. Herrin's insurance renewal. Dr. Herrin was therefore
forced to discontinue his surgery practice.
Dr. Herrin sued Medical Protective on April 9, 1999 for, among other
things, breach of fiduciary duty. Medical Protective filed both a no-evi-
dence motion for summary judgment and a traditional motion for sum-
mary judgment. The trial court granted Medical Protective's motion for
summary judgment on all of Dr. Herrin's claims, without specifying on
what grounds it relied in reaching its decision."13 The Texarkana Court of
Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that Dr. Her-
rin's long-standing relationship with the insurance agent raised a question
of fact as to the existence of an informal confidential relationship that
gave rise to an informal fiduciary duty.114
The court stated that informal fiduciary relationships arise in circum-
stances "where a special confidence is reposed in another who in equity
and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to
the interests of the one reposing confidence."' 15 The court found that
110. Id. at 563-65 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
111. Herrin v. Med. Protective Co., 89 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet.
filed).
112. Id. at 304.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 311.
115. Id. at 307-08 (citing Tex. Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Tex.




there was evidence that the confidential relationship between Dr. Herrin
and Medical Protective, specifically through the insurance agent, Chuck
Curtice, gave rise to "a potential informal fiduciary relationship."1 16
During his deposition, Curtice testified that he had known and worked
with Dr. Herrin for fifteen years. Dr. Herrin testified that "he trusted
Curtice's advice concerning the settlement because of the nature of their
long-standing relationship." ' 1 7 Curtice had attended the mediation of the
medical malpractice case and told Dr. Herrin that "the $300,000 settle-
ment was 'nothing unusual' and would have no effect on his relationship
with Medical [Protective]." ' 18 Dr. Herrin had also been covered by Med-
ical Protective for thirty-one years, and he "testified repeatedly about his
trust in Medical [Protective] and their special relationship, which re-
quired honesty and disclosure." ' 19 Thus, "[w]hile informal fiduciary rela-
tionships are rarely recognized," the summary judgment evidence in
Herrin raised the "possibility that a fact-finder could find such a relation-
ship existed."'120 Apparently a claims adjuster for Medical Protective can
bind the company to renew an insured's policy indefinitely by making
statements to procure consent.
G. GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S DUTY TO
SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEES
In Lee Lewis Construction, Inc. v. Harrison,'2' a general contractor
challenged the legal sufficiency of the jury's findings that the general con-
tractor owed a duty to a worker, Jimmy Harrison, who fell to his death
from the tenth story of a construction site. The Texas Supreme Court
held that there was sufficient evidence that the general contractor re-
tained control of the subcontractor's fall protection measures and thus
owed a duty to the subcontractor's workers. 122
The court stated that it is well-established that a general contractor
does not ordinarily "owe a duty to ensure that an independent contractor
performs its work in a safe manner.' 23 The general contractor does have
such a duty, however, if it "retains some control over the manner in which
the independent contractor performs its work. ' 124 "The general contrac-
tor's duty of care is commensurate with the control that it retains.' 25
Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains this principle:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who re-
tains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for
116. Id. at 308.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 304.
119. Id. at 308.
120. Id.
121. Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2001).
122. Id. at 782.
123. Id. at 783 (citing Elliott-Williams Co. v. Diaz, 9 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Tex. 1999);
Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendez, 967 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. 1998)).
124. Id. (citing Diaz, 9 S.W.3d at 803).
125. Id. (citing Diaz, 9 S.W.3d at 803; Mendez, 967 S.W.2d at 355).
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physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to
exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his
control with reasonable care. 126
A general contractor thus owes a duty of reasonable care to a subcontrac-
tor's employee, and consequently "may be liable for injury to that em-
ployee, if the general contractor retains control over part of the work to
be performed. '127
A general contractor may create a duty of care to its independent con-
tractor's employees in two ways: "by contract or by actual exercise of
control."'1 28 The Texas Supreme Court has frequently used the phrases
"right of control" or "retained control" interchangeably.1 2 9 In Lee Lewis
Construction, the court reminded us that the distinction is important be-
cause "determining what a contract says is generally a question of law for
the court, while determining whether someone exercised actual control is
a generally a question of fact for the jury."'130
Evidence at trial supported the family's contention that the contractor
observed and expressly approved of decedent's employer using faulty
fall-protection equipment. The evidence constituted "more than a scin-
tilla of evidence that [the contractor] retained the right to control fall-
protection systems on the jobsite."1 31 The contractor had "observed and
expressly approved" of the safety measures used by the subcontractor. 132
In fact, the contractor had assigned its superintendent "the responsibility
to routinely inspect the ninth and tenth floor addition to the south tower
to see to it that the subcontractors and their employees properly utilized
fall protection equipment. '133 There was also evidence that the superin-
tendent "definitely did approve" the subcontractor's fall protection sys-
tem.134 This, the court held, was more than a scintilla of evidence that the
contractor retained control of the subcontractor's fall protection system
and therefore had a duty to the subcontractor's employees.1 35
Justice Hecht agreed with the majority's outcome, but felt that the ma-
jority omitted a portion of the analysis. Based on section 414 of the Re-
statement (Second of Torts, there are thus two requirements for an
employer to be liable for injuries caused by the work of an independent
contractor: (1) the employer must retain control of the work; and (2) the
injured party must be someone "for whose safety the employer owes a
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
127. Lee Lewis Constr., 70 S.W.3d at 783 ("When the general contractor exercises some
control over a subcontractor's work he may be liable unless he exercises reasonable care in
supervising the subcontractor's activity.").
128. Id.; see also Koch Ref. Co. v. Chapa, 11 S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. 1999); Coastal
Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1999).
129. See Chapa, 11 S.W.3d at 155; Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d at 226.
130. Lee Lewis Constr., 70 S.W.3d at 783.
131. Id. at 784.
132. Id. at 783-84.





duty of reasonable care." 136 Justice Hecht did not join the majority opin-
ion because it did not address this second requirement. Justice Hecht,
after examining the history of section 414 and the law of other jurisdic-
tions, concluded that "when the Sections of this Chapter speak of liability
to 'another' or 'others,' or to 'third persons,' it is to be understood that
the employees of the contractor, as well as those of the defendant [em-
ployer] himself, are not included.' 37
Justice Hecht provides two reasons to exclude employees of the con-
tractor in this group: (1) liability is inconsistent with the workers' com-
pensation system, and (2) liability is inconsistent with the general nature
of the relationship between an independent contractor and its em-
ployer."'1 38 Justice Hecht then provides several considerations supporting
these reasons.
As to the first reason-inconsistency with the workers' compensations
system-there are three considerations cited by Justice Hecht. First, the
cost hiring of a subcontractor presumably includes the cost of the work-
ers' compensation coverage. 139 Since the employer must pay for this cov-
erage (at least indirectly), it should receive the benefits.' 40 Second, "[a]n
employer should not be exposed to greater risk of liability for wisely en-
trusting peculiarly dangerous work to a better-skilled independent con-
tractor than if he had undertaken the job with his own less capable
employees."' 4' Third, "[a] worker should not have greater rights as an
employee of an independent contractor than he would have as an em-
ployee of the contractor's employer.' 42
The second reason for excluding the contractor's employees-inconsis-
tency with the nature of the employer/independent contractor relation-
ship-had two supporting considerations. First, the independent
contractor is in a better position to protect its own employees. 143 In fact,
employers often hire independent contractors for their expertise in a par-
ticular area and familiarity with the safety precautions necessary for their
specialty. Second, "[a]n employer's liability for accidents should not in-
crease the harder he tries to ensure that his independent contractors work
safely and decrease the less he cares what happens."' 44
Justice Hecht, nevertheless, agreed with the majority opinion. The
family of an employee can sue its employer when the worker is killed due
to the employer's gross negligence. 45 "In that situation," Justice Hecht
concludes, "holding the employer of an independent contractor liable for
136. Id. at 788 n.2 (Hecht, J., concurring quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 414 (1965)).
137. Id. at 794. (Hecht, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 795. (Hecht, J., concurring).
139. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
140. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 796. (Hecht, J., concurring).
142. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
143. Id. n.47. (Hecht, J., concurring).
144. Id. n.47 (Hecht, J., concurring).
145. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(b) (Vernon 1996).
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failing to exercise a retained control over the contractor's work is not
inconsistent with the worker's compensation system."' 46 The employer
of the independent contractor is not denied any benefits of indirectly pay-
ing the premiums, he is not exposed to any additional risks to which he
would not be exposed if he used his own employees, and the worker has
no greater rights simply because he is the employee of an independent
contractor.
147
As to the inconsistency of imposing such liability with the nature of the
employer/independent contractor relationship, Justice Hecht states, "[I]t
is hardly unreasonable to expect the employer to take some action to
prevent a contractor's grossly negligent conduct of which the employer is
actually aware."'1 48 In this case, there is no disincentive for the employer
to improve worker safety, and an employer would not be free to sit by
and observe grossly negligent conduct. 149
But since Lee Lewis Construction was so obviously grossly negligent in
this case, the court did not have occasion to directly address Justice
Hecht's well-articulated policy concerns. The court will likely have occa-
sion to do so in the near future. Thus, Texas attorneys should keep in
mind the rule that at least Justices Hecht and Owen will advocate in this
situation: An employer is not liable for injuries to the employees of an
independent contractor, unless the independent contractor was grossly
negligent, and the employer was aware of "an extremely likely and seri-
ous risk of harm" to the contractor's employees and was consciously in-
different to it.15 ° Although such a radical departure from common law
precedent seems better suited for legislative action, expect Justice Hecht
to soon seek the change judicially.
H. FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Williams,151 an employee was injured
at a train derailment site when flying debris hit him in the back. He sued
the company, which requested the trial court to submit a proposed fore-
seeability jury instruction. The trial court denied the request, and the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee. The appellate court
affirmed and held that the railroad's proposed instruction confused fore-
seeability with causation. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, holding that "the proposed instruction relate[d] to Union
Pacific's duty to Williams to use reasonable care at the derailment
site."l 5 2
Under the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA"), "railroads that
engage in interstate commerce are liable in damages to their employees
146. Lee Lewis Constr., 70 S.W.3d at 798. (Hecht, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
148. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
149. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 798-99. (Hecht, J., concurring).
151. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. 2002).
152. Id. at 163.
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for injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of the
railroad's employees or defects in its equipment. ' 153 Under FELA, "a
plaintiff must show that the defendant railroad did not use reasonable
care under the circumstances."'1 54 The railroad's duty to use reasonable
care in a particular circumstance is determined by whether the railroad
could have reasonably foreseen the harm suffered by the injured
worker. 155 A worker is not, however, required to prove proximate cause.
Under FELA, a defendant is liable if its negligence played any part, how-
ever, slight, in causing the injury.156
Foreseeability is also, however, an element of duty.' 57 Whether a legal
duty exists, including the foreseeability element, is typically a legal ques-
tion.' 58 The court in Williams notes that if the essential facts about fore-
seeability as an element of the railroad's duty are disputed, the question
is a fact issue for the jury.159 Evidence is disputed when it "does not
conclusively establish the pertinent facts or the reasonable inferences to
be drawn from those facts.' 160 In Williams, there was conflicting testi-
mony by various Union Pacific employees about the potential danger at
the derailment site.
In considering the issue, the court overruled Mitchell v. Missouri-Kan-
sas-Texas Railroad Co.,' 61 "to the extent that it rejected a foreseeability
instruction when the evidence about that element of a railroad's duty was
disputed.' 62 The court also overruled Mitchell to the extent that it ap-
proved the Fifth Circuit's pattern jury instruction because "it does not
place the issue of duty before the jury" even when the railroad's knowl-
edge of the risk was disputed. The court held that, because the evidence
of the company's duty was disputed, the trial court should have instructed
the jury about this element so that it would be able to resolve the factual
issue.' 63
The next issue was how to determine when foreseeability is disputed.
The court states in Williams that there must be "something more than a
153. Id. at 165 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1986)).
154. Id. at 166.
155. See Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 118 (1963) (stating that
the defendant's duty is "measured by what a reasonably prudent person would anticipate
as resulting from a particular condition."); Armstrong v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 752 F.2d
1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985) ( holding that a FELA plaintiff must show that the railroad "with
the exercise of due care, could have reasonably foreseen that a particular condition could
cause injury."); Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 503 (1957) (holding that the test
is whether the railroad was or should have been aware of conditions which created a likeli-
hood that the employee would suffer the type of injury he did); see also Ringhiser v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901, 901 (1957) (per curiam) (same).
156. Williams, 85 S.W.3d at 168.
157. Id.
158. Mitchell v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1990).
159. Williams, 85 S.W.3d at 168 (citing Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662).
160. Id. at 166 (quoting Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
161. Mitchell, 786 S.W. 2d at 659.




generalized threat" to show foreseeability under FELA.1 64 The defen-
dant must know that the conditions create a likelihood that the plaintiff
"would suffer the type of injury he did."'165 In Williams, no one really
doubted that there are dangers at a derailment site, but since there was
conflicting testimony as to whether there was a danger of flying objects,
the trial court should have instructed the jury on foreseeability.
I. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece,166 Wal-Mart argued that the evidence
was legally insufficient to conclude that the store had constructive notice
of a "pizza-size" puddle of clear liquid near the snack bar that caused
Lizzie Reece to slip and fall. 167 Due to the fall, Ms. Reece injured her
knee and required surgery. 168 A Wal-Mart employee, who was responsi-
ble for keeping that area clear, was in line directly in front of Ms. Reece
and walked right by the puddle. He was also a mere eight feet from Ms.
Reece when she fell. Furthermore, the puddle was near the ice and drink
machine where Wal-Mart and its employee knew that there were fre-
quent spills. The jury and the intermediate appellate court applied com-
mon sense and found that this was sufficient evidence for a jury to find
that Wal-Mart had constructive notice. The Texas Supreme Court dis-
agreed, and in a opinion by Justice O'Neill, held that this constituted no
evidence, reversed the trial court, and rendered a take-nothing verdict for
Wal-Mart. 169
The Texas Supreme Court noted that "Wal-Mart owed Reece, its invi-
tee, a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect her from dangerous con-
ditions in the store that were known or reasonably discoverable, but it
was not an insurer of her safety. ' 170 To prevail in her case, Ms. Reece
had to prove that "Wal-Mart had actual or constructive notice of the
spill.1 71 "A slip-and-fall plaintiff satisfys the notice element by establish-
ing that (1) the defendant placed the substance on the floor, (2) the de-
fendant actually knew that the substance was on the floor, or (3) it is
more likely than not that the condition existed long enough to give the
premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it."'1 72 Ms. Reece
had "no evidence" that Wal-Mart placed the fluid on the floor or that
Wal-Mart actually knew it was there. She therefore had to prove that
Wal-Mart had a reasonable opportunity to discover it.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. 2002).
167. Id. at 813.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 814.
171. Id. (citing Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992); Corbin v.




Wal-Mart argued that its "employee's proximity to a hazard cannot by
itself, impute constructive notice because such a rule would not afford
premises owners a fair opportunity to inspect and correct, or warn about,
the condition.' 1 73 Wal-Mart also argued that "mere proof an employee
might have discovered the condition by being close to it misstates the
plaintiff's burden and requires premises owners to be omniscient."'1 74 Fi-
nally, Wal-Mart argued that such a rule "imposes constructive notice the
instant a hazard is created, whether or not there was a reasonable oppor-
tunity to discover it, thus violating the principle that premises owners are
not insurers of their invitees' safety."' 175
These arguments make little sense in this case, and the court should
arguably have followed the jury's lead. A Wal-Mart employee walked
past the "medium-pizza-size spill" right before Ms. Reece slipped on it.
Wal-Mart conceded that this area had frequent spills. Thus, anytime an
employee walks past an area where there are frequent spills, he or she
should check for a spill. When the employee walked by that spill, that
was Wal-Mart's "fair opportunity to inspect and correct, or warn about,
the condition."' 176 Holding Wal-Mart liable in this case would not be re-
quiring Wal-Mart to be "omniscient"-since its employee walked right by
the spill and thus enjoyed a fair opportunity to inspect the area. Finally,
nothing in Ms. Reece's argument would impose constructive notice the
instant a spill happened. It would, however, impose constructive notice
when an employee walks within inches of a spill in an area where the
employee knows there is a high risk of spills and does not bother to rea-
sonably inspect the area.
The supreme court noted there seemed to be a split in the appellate
districts on the issue of proximity evidence. It noted that some courts
seem to hold that "proximity evidence alone is insufficient to establish
constructive notice absent some indication that the hazard existed long
enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover
it,' 177 while other courts "have suggested that evidence of an employee's
proximity to a dangerous condition can establish constructive notice."1 78
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 815.
176. Id. at 814.
177. Id. at 815 (citing the following cases for the following holdings: Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Rosa, 52 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (holding that
employees' proximity to area where plaintiff fell did not tend to prove how long the condi-
tion had existed for purposes of charging constructive notice); Furr's, Inc. v. Sigala, 608
S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ) (holding mere fact employee was in
same aisle when and where accident occurred not sufficient); H.E.B. Foods, Inc. v. Moore,
599 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (holding fact that em-
ployee was in immediate vicinity when plaintiff fell is not sufficient to raise an inference
that premises owner should have discovered it); and Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Giles, 354
S.W.2d 410, 414-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same)).
178. Id. (citing the following cases for the following propositions: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Garcia, 30 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (noting proximity
evidence as one reason that the premises owner should have known of the hazard);
Duncan v. Black-Eyed Pea U.S.A., Inc., 994 S.W.2d 447, 449-50 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
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Even a brief review of these cases demonstrates that there was something
more in the cases relying on proximity that had nothing to do with the
amount of time the hazard was on the floor. Two such factors are obvi-
ous: (1) the conspicuous nature of the hazard, and (2) whether there was
a known risk of the hazard. If there is an employee in close proximity to
a hazard and one of these two factors is present, that is evidence of con-
structive notice. The latter of these two was clearly present in Wal-Mart
v. Reece.
Justice O'Neill, however, dwelled on the absence of evidence concern-
ing the length of time the puddle was on the floor: "The rule requiring
proof that a dangerous condition existed for some length of time before a
premises owner may be charged with constructive notice is firmly rooted
in our jurisprudence. 1t 79 If the hazard was on the floor one second after
an employee who was aware of the risk and who had a duty to keep that
area clean walked by it, that is long enough.
As Justice O'Neill notes in her opinion,
The so-called "time-notice rule" is based on the premise that tempo-
ral evidence best indicates whether the owner had a reasonable op-
portunity to discover and remedy a dangerous condition. An
employee's proximity to a hazard, with no evidence indicating how
long the hazard was there, merely indicates that it was possible for
the premises owner to discover the condition, not that the premises
owner reasonably should have discovered it. Constructive notice de-
mands a more extensive inquiry. Without some temporal evidence,
there is no basis upon which the factfinder can reasonably assess the
opportunity the premises owner had to discover the dangerous
condition. 180
Suppose a janitor is seen standing one foot from a large spill in the area
of a store that he is responsible for maintaining one minute before an
elderly lady slips and falls on the spill and breaks her hip. Assume fur-
ther that this area is known to have frequent spills that create a hazard,
yet the janitor denies that he saw the spill. Under Justice O'Neill's analy-
sis, if the plaintiff could not present at least some evidence as to how long
that spill was on the floor before the janitor was seen standing next to it,
the plaintiffs cannot recover. Her reasoning for this rule is unsound: "An
1999, pet. denied) (holding evidence that plaintiff fell in an area frequently traversed by
defendant's employees sufficient); Furr's Super Market v. Garrett, 615 S.W.2d 280, 281-82
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding evidence sufficient when five
employees were located five to six feet away from hazard for continuous time before, dur-
ing, and after fall); Albertson's, Inc. v. Mungia, 602 S.W.2d 359, 362-63 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (finding circumstantial evidence sufficient when water from
ice machine was in close proximity to cash register where employee was positioned, an-
other employee was handing a bag of ice to a store customer when plaintiff fell, and water
accumulation was of sufficient size to cause water to run in a stream toward cash register);
and Kimbell, Inc. v. Hernandez, 572 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no
writ) (concluding evidence was sufficient where grocery clerk was three or four feet from,
and in full view of, the "rather large quantity" of spilled ice that caused the fall)).
179. Id. at 815.
180. Id. at 816.
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employees proximity to a hazard, with no evidence indicating how long
the hazard was there, merely indicates that it was possible for the prem-
ises owner to discover the condition, not that the premises owner reason-
ably should have discovered it."' 81
Are there not other factors besides time that could indicate that the
premises owner should have noticed the hazard when employees are in
close proximity, such as knowledge that there is a risk of spills in the area,
the size of the spill, and the conspicuous nature of the spill (ice cream or
water)? And while Justice O'Neill alludes to these other factors, she sees
them as factors to determine how long in time the hazard has to be there
before the premises owner can be charged with constructive notice. She
fails to see what the jury so plainly saw in this case. If a spill is on the
floor long enough for an employee to walk right by it, while aware of a
possibility that it was there and with a duty to keep that area clear of such
hazards, that's long enough.
III. CAUSATION
In Excel Corp. v. Apodaca,82 Jimmy Apodaca suffered from cumula-
tive trauma disorders (CTD) while working at Excel's beef packing plant.
Apodaca sued Excel, which was a non-subscriber under the Texas Work-
ers' Compensation Act, for negligence and gross negligence in failing to
provide a safe workplace. During his last three years working in the beef
packing plant, Apodaca's job was to place 40-pound bags of meat onto a
cryovac machine that removed air from the bag and sealed it. The job
required Apodaca to bend down and grab a 40-pound bag, pick the bag
up, turn, and place the bag on the machine. He did this every three
seconds. This repeated stress resulted in injuries to Apodaca's neck,
back, and wrist. 183
At trial, the jury found Excel negligent in the design of Apodaca's
work area due to the excessive reaching, bending, and pulling without
appropriate rest periods and awarded Apodaca $536,472 in damages.' 84
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, Excel argued that Apodaca had
presented no evidence that, if Excel had done something different at the
worksite, Apodaca would not have been injured or would not have been
injured as severely. 185
Apodaca presented three categories of evidence to show that his inju-
ries were caused or exacerbated by Excel's failure to provide a safe work-
place: "(1) testimony from Excel employees about recommended or
requested changes to the cryovac worksite and about recommended ergo-
nomics and medical-management programs; (2) Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) recommendations about changes to the
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Excel Corp. v. Apodaca, 81 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. 2002).
183. Id. at 819.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 820.
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cryovac worksite and the use of symptoms surveys; and (3) medical testi-
mony linking Apodaca's injuries to his job."1 86
With regard to testimony of employees, Apodaca highlighted the testi-
mony of a safety and ergonomics coordinator at Excel, James Rudd.
Among Rudd's job responsibilities was to train Excel employees to "rec-
ognize potential contributors to and risk factors for CTDs, learn ways to
control risk factors, and encourage early reporting and treatment of
CTDs. '' 187 Rudd testified that in his experience, "cryovac operators spe-
cifically were exposed to such risks. ' 188 Apodaca, Rudd, a former Excel
safety director, the chief union steward for Apodaca's floor, Apodaca's
supervisor, and other Excel employees all "testified to the difficulties and
risks presented by the cryovac operator environment and job
requirements." 89
Apodaca also introduced evidence of several OSHA findings and rec-
ommendations. OSHA had recommended annual use of a "symptoms-
survey checklist."190 Such annual surveys can identify work areas or the
jobs where there is a high potential for CTD and provide data on the
number of workers experiencing some form of CTD. Excel did not use
these surveys in the years in which Apodaca worked on the cryovac ma-
chine. OSHA and Excel employees had also requested that Excel install
a photo eye on the cryovac machine to detect meat bags on the conveyor
belt and control the rate at which it delivered bags to the cryovac ma-
chine. OSHA also recommended that Excel alter the cryovac operator
work space so that the operators would not have to reach more than six-
teen to eighteen inches and bend no further than six to ten degrees. This
would have reduced "deviated postures and extended reaches, which con-
tribute to CTDs."'191 Excel did not comply with any of the OSHA
recommendations.
Finally, Apodaca presented testimony from three treating physicians,
who all agreed that at least his wrist problems were work related. One of
the three stated that all of his injuries were job related.
While agreeing that the employee testimony, evidence of Excel's fail-
ure to follow OSHA recommendations, and the physician testimony es-
tablished the foreseeability element of proximate cause,1 92 the Texas
Supreme Court found that there was no evidence of the second element,
cause in fact.193 The test for cause in fact is "whether the act or omission




189. Id. at 821.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Foreseeability means that a person of ordinary intelligence would have anticipated
the danger his or her negligence creates. Id. at 821-22 (citing El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732




would not have occurred."1 94 "A finding of cause in fact cannot be sup-
ported by 'mere conjecture, guess, or speculation,' but "may be based on
either direct or circumstantial evidence.' ' 95
There appears to have been a substantial amount of circumstantial evi-
dence. Apodaca had worked at Excel for more than twenty years. Dur-
ing that time he had held several different positions that were "physically
demanding."' 196 However, it was not until he began a job that required
him to twist, bend, grasp, and pull a 40-pound bag of meat every three
seconds that he sustained debilitating injuries to his neck, back, and wrists
that rendered him unable to work. Furthermore, the testimony from the
Excel employees and the evidence from OSHA made it obvious that the
work environment at the cryovac machine was dangerous, and there was
no other explanation for Apodaca's crippling injuries. That appears to be
at least some circumstantial evidence that the work environment caused
Apodaca's injuries.
The Texas Supreme Court simply ignored this evidence in its analysis.
The court stated:
[W]e have reviewed the record in its entirety and can find no evi-
dence that [the OSHA-recommended] symptoms surveys, conducted
anonymously to identify worksite problems, would have identified
Apodaca's CTD injuries earlier, thereby allowing CTD reversal
through conservative treatment. Nor is there any evidence that mod-
ifications to the cryovac work environment would have reduced the
number of injuries or the CTD incident rate for Apodaca's job. No
evidence in the record indicates that had Apodaca performed fewer
repetitions per hour, worked at a more comfortable work station, or
had a photo eye on his machine, he would not have sustained his
injuries. Furthermore, the fact that the meatpacking industry, or
even just the cryovac operator position, had a high injury rate is not
probative evidence of whether under different conditions, the cry-
ovac operator job would have a lower injury rate. If anything, much
of Apodaca's evidence fulfills only the foreseeability element of
proximate cause by demonstrating the dangerous nature of the cry-
ovac operator position.'97
The court also noted that Apodaca's doctors had agreed that at least his
wrist injury was caused by his work environment. One of the three doc-
tors believed all of his injuries were caused by his job. The court then
stated that "no doctor linked those injuries to anything Excel did or failed
to do."'198 But that is not true-if the injuries are caused by his work
environment, it necessarily follows that they were caused by Excel's fail-
ure to provide a safe work environment. Safe work environments do not
cause crippling injuries.
194. Excel Corp., 81 S.W.3d at 820.
195. Id. (quoting Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1992))(em-
phasis added).
196. Id. at 819.
197. Id. at 821-22 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 822.
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The court concluded that "the evidence does not show that had Excel
modified the cryovac worksite or job requirements, or had it conducted
symptoms surveys, Apodaca would not have suffered his injuries or they
would have been diagnosed sooner and reversed using other treat-
ments."' 99 But the safety and ergonomics coordinator, the risk manager,
the other employees, and the physicians agreed that the work environ-
ment was dangerous and caused Apodaca's injuries. They also agreed
that with the recommended changes the work environment would not be
dangerous, i.e., it would not have caused those injuries. That is why they
were recommended. So what exactly was missing? What evidence
should Apodaca have introduced? The Texas Supreme Court does not
say.
IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. CLAIMS RELATED TO A VIABLE FETUS
In Reese v. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital, Inc.,200 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals held that the parents of a viable unborn fetus can seek
recovery for the child's death when the death is caused by medical negli-
gence. The court further held that the mother of the fetus could also sue
for medical malpractice.
In 1999, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in Parvin v. Dean,20 1
that the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes allow recovery for
the death of a viable fetus. The question presented in Reese was whether
that holding required the court to "allow appellants to seek recovery for
the death of their viable full-term unborn child where the death resulted
from acts of medical negligence. '202
Tara and Donnie Reese's unborn child died in utero on May 12, 1998
after Tara was admitted to Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital for a rapid
heartbeat and dizziness. The Reeses sued Tara's treating physicians and
the hospital individually and as the legal representatives of Clarence
Reese. The defendants filed summary judgment motions arguing that the
Reeses could not recover for injury to or the death of an unborn fetus.
The defendants also argued that Tara and Donnie Reese could not main-
tain their individual claims because "they were merely bystanders to any
injury and thus are prevented, as a matter of law, from any recovery in
medical malpractice cases. ' 20 3 The trial court granted the defendants'
summary judgment motions.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded in Parvin that "no rational
or compelling state interest exists to 'justify the wrongful death and sur-
vival statutes' unequal application to born babies while at the same time
199. Id.
200. Reese v. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2002, pet. filed).
201. Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
202. Reese, 87 S.W.3d at 204.
203. Id. at 204-05.
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excluding viable but unborn babies and the unequal application to their
parents." 204
The defendants in Reese argued that the court should reconsider the
Parvin opinion, or in the alternative, hold that it did not apply in medical
malpractice cases. The court quickly dispatched this argument and af-
firmed its holding in Parvin.205
The court next considered the defendants' argument that Tara and
Donnie Reese could not maintain individual causes of action for medical
malpractice. The plaintiffs' summary judgment evidence included testi-
mony by their expert Dr. Bruce Halbridge, a board certified specialist in
obstetrics and gynecology, who testified by affidavit that the defendants
doctors' "failure to perform standard fetal diagnostic tests" and the hos-
pital nursing staff's failure "to maintain continuous fetal rate heart moni-
toring," proximately caused injuries to Tara Reese.20 6 Dr. Halbridge also
testified that "a timely Caesarean section delivery" would have allowed
Tara Reese to avoid a "long and painful delivery" that produced her still-
born child. Tara also provided an affidavit describing her delivery and the
"emotional mental pain, anxiety, and sadness" that it caused.207
This was obviously evidence that the alleged medical negligence caused
injuries to Tara as well as the baby. The court also noted that Tara was
the defendants' patient.208 The court found that Donnie Reese, however,
was not a patient and was at least, in part, seeking to bring a bystander
claim for the medical treatment provided to his wife. 209 Since Texas law
does not recognize bystander recovery in medical malpractice cases,210
the court upheld this portion of the summary judgment.
B. SCOPE OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE
IMPROVEMENT ACT
There were several cases decided during the Survey period discussing
the scope of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
("MLIIA"). 211 In Russell v. Murphy,212 the Dallas Court of Appeals held
that a patient's claim of violation of the DTPA, breach of contract, and
battery claims fell outside the scope of the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act. Johnette Russell was admitted to Zale Lipshy
Hospital on September 15, 1998 where she underwent a biopsy requiring
anesthesia. Russell told the anesthesiologist that she did not want to be
sedated or to lose consciousness and that she only wanted a local anes-




208. Id. at 205-06 (citing Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.
1997)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 206 (citing Edinburg Hosp., 941 S.W.2d at 79).
211. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon 2003).
212. Russell v. Murphy, 86 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. filed).
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thetic. Russell claimed that the anesthesiologist agreed. When Russell
was taken into the operating room, however, she felt dizzy and lost con-
sciousness. The anesthesiologist had sedated her against her wishes.
Russell sued the anesthesiologist for "violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, breach of oral contract, and battery based on the
anesthesiologist 'knowingly and intentionally administering or causing
the administration of a sedative." 2 13 After the expiration of 180 days, the
anesthesiologist filed a motion to dismiss Russell's claims, contending
they were "health care liability claims" subject to the requirements of the
MLIIA. 214 Section 13.01(d) of the Act states:
Not later than the later of the 180th day after the date on which a
health care liability claim is filed or the last day of any extended
period established under Subsection (f) or (h) of this section, the
claimant shall, for each physician or health care provider against
whom a claim is asserted:
(1) furnish to counsel for each physician or health care provider one
or more expert reports, with a curriculum vitae of each expert listed
in the report; or
(2) voluntarily nonsuit the action against the physician or health
care provider.21 5
Section 13.01(e) states:
If a claimant has failed, for any defendant physician or health care
provider, to comply with subsection (d) of this section within the
time required, the court shall, on the motion of the affected physi-
cian or health care provider, enter an order awarding as sanctions
against the claimant or the claimant's attorney:
(1) the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court incurred by that
defendant;
(2) the forfeiture of any cost bond respecting the claimant's claim
against that defendant to the extent necessary to pay the award; and
(3) the dismissal of the action of the claimant against that defendant
with prejudice to the claim's refiling.2 16
Russell did not submit such a report (commonly referred to as a "4590i
report") within 180 days after filing suit or seek an extension of time.2 17
The anesthesiologist therefore argued the claims against him must be dis-
missed. Russell appealed the trial court's dismissal order arguing that
"her claims are not based on allegations of medical negligence but are
213. Id. at 747.
214. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 1.03(a)(4) (Vernon 2003).
215. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d) (Vernon 2003).
216. Id. § 13.01(e).
217. Russell, 86 S.W.3d at 747. Section 13.01(r)(6) states:
"Expert report" means a written report by an expert that provides a fair
summary of the expert's opinions as of the date of the report regarding appli-
cable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physi-
cian or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal
relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(r)(6).
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based instead upon a broken promise, '2 18 and therefore are not covered
by the MLIIA.
The Dallas Court of Appeals framed the issue as "whether the plain-
tiff's claims against the defendant doctor fall outside the scope of the
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act or whether the plain-
tiff has merely attempted to frame her claims in such a way as to avoid
the standards and requirements of the Act. '219 The court had stated that
"to determine whether the claim is a 'health care liability claim' covered
by the Act," courts must "examine the underlying nature of the plaintiff's
claims.1220 To be a "health care liability claim," the plaintiff must be bas-
ing the claim on "a health care provider's breach of an accepted standard
of medical care, health care, or safety. 2 21 In examining "the underlying
nature of a claim," the "focus is on what a plaintiff must prove to pre-
vail."' 222 Does the plaintiff have to prove that a health care provider
breached an applicable standard of care?
In Russell, the court concluded that Russell did not have to prove that
the anesthesiologist breached the standard of care. Russell was not
claiming that there was a problem with the way the anesthesiologist ad-
ministered the sedative or that there was a lack of informed consent. She
was properly told about the risks and benefits of the sedative. Russell
based her claims on the anesthesiologist giving her the sedative despite
her specific request that he not do so. The court therefore found that
Russell "simply claims that specific promises and representations were
made by [the anesthesiologist] and then broken. '22 3 Thus, "[t]o succeed
on her claims as alleged in her petition, it is not necessary for Russell to
show that [the anesthesiologist] breached accepted standards of medical
care, health care, or safety. '224 Since Russell was not asserting a health
care liability claim, she was not required to file a 4590i report, and the
trial court should not have dismissed her case for failing to do so.
In Rose v. Garland Community Hospital,225 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals held that the plaintiff's negligent credentialing/re-credentialing
claims against Garland Community Hospital were not health care liability
claims within the scope of the MLIIA.
Debi Rose underwent several cosmetic surgeries at Garland Commu-
nity Hospital in 1998 and 1999. James H. Fowler, M.D., an ear, nose, and
throat specialist, performed the surgeries. Afterwards, Rose suffered
"painful and unsightly scarring around her face, breasts, abdomen, and
218. Russell, 86 S.W.3d at 748.
219. Id. at 748.
220. Id. (citing MacGregor Med. Ass'n v. Campbell, 985 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1998);
Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. 1994)).
221. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 1.03(a)(4), 12.01(a); see also
Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 242.
222. Russell, 86 S.W.3d at 748.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Rose v. Garland Cmty. Hosp., 87 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
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other parts of her body. '226 Rose sued Fowler for medical malpractice
and Garland Community Hospital for negligent credentialing.227 Gar-
land Community Hospital moved to dismiss Rose's claims pursuant to
section 13.01 of the MLIIA on the ground that Rose had not made a good
faith effort to comply with the MLIIA's requirement that she file an ex-
pert report.
The Dallas Court of Appeals framed the issue as "whether Rose's neg-
ligent credentialing/recredentialing claims against the Hospital are health
care liability claims as defined under section 1.03(a)(4) of the Act.1228
The court found that they were not.
The court noted that the hospital is a "health care provider" as defined
under the MLIIA and that hospitals have "an independent duty to 'exer-
cise reasonable care in the selection of its medical staff and to periodi-
cally monitor and review the medical staff's competence.'"229 This duty
is owed directly to the patient. 230 Credentialing is "a process in which the
hospital's governing body or a medical peer review committee approved
by the governing body grants a physician authorization to provide specific
patient care and treatment services in the hospital within defined
limits. "231
After examining various definitions, the court found that in order for
the actions about which the plaintiff complains to be "health care," the
"alleged acts or omissions must have been performed or furnished or
should have been performed or furnished for, to, or on behalf of [the
plaintiff] during her medical care, treatment, or confinement. In other
words, the complained-of acts or omissions must be an inseparable part
of the rendition of medical services. '232 A hospital makes the initial
credentialing decision when the physician applies for privileges. It is sep-
arable from the rendition of medical services to the patient.
[T]he credentialing/recredentialing process is not performed during a
patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. The credentialing/
recredentialing process occurs separate from a patient's medical care
and before a physician can treat a patient in the hospital; otherwise,
the physician would not be allowed to either admit or treat the pa-
226. Id. at 189.
227. The specific allegations included (i) allowing Dr. Fowler to perform and continue
to perform surgery, (ii) entrusting the operating room and equipment to Dr. Fowler, (iii)
recommending, granting, renewing, and continuing Dr. Fowler's staff privileges, (iv) failing
to deny or suspend Dr. Fowler's staff privileges and perform a reasonable investigation,
and (v) failing to perform a reasonable investigation into the background, qualifications,
history of surgical cases, and history of serious malpractice before recommending, granting,
renewing, and continuing Dr. Fowler's staff privileges at a time when it knew or should
have known the doctor was a reckless and careless physician and constituted a threat to his
patients' safety. Id.
228. Id. at 190.




232. Id. at 192.
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tient. Thus, Rose has not alleged a cause of action against the Hospi-
tal claiming it departed from accepted standards of health care.233
The Dallas Court of Appeals therefore reversed the trial court's dismissal
of the case and remanded the case.
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY-ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL V. WOLFF
In St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff,234 the Texas Supreme Court re-ex-
amined, among other theories of vicarious liability, the "joint enterprise"
theory. St. Joseph appealed a finding that it was vicariously liable for the
negligent act of a resident who treated the plaintiff. St. Joseph is a teach-
ing hospital that sponsored a medical residency program. One of its re-
sidents negligently treated a patient while the resident, as part of the
residency training program, was receiving training at another hospital
under the immediate supervision of the other medical institution's agent.
The court concluded there was "no evidence to support the jury's findings
of joint enterprise, joint venture, 'mission' or non-employee respondeat
superior, or ratification. '235 The court also concluded that "the undis-
puted evidence proved conclusively, or as a matter of law, that when the
resident treated the patient he was acting as the borrowed employee of
the medical institution supervising him. '236
Stacy Wolff was injured in a traffic accident in 1994 and subsequently
flown to Brackenridge Hospital in Austin, Texas. When she arrived, her
attending physician, Dr. David Harshaw, and a third-year resident, Dr.
Mario Villafani, performed a tracheostomy and inserted a breathing tube
in Wolff's throat. Several days later, Wolff began to bleed from the surgi-
cal site. Dr. Villafani recognized the bleeding but did not tell the attend-
ing physician, Dr. Harshaw, or the chief resident. After one bleeding
episode, Wolff went into cardiac and respiratory arrest, which left her
with severe brain damage. 237
During his treatment of Wolff, Dr. Villafani was a resident at St. Joseph
Hospital in Houston. The Central Texas Medical Foundation (the "Foun-
dation") was a "participating institution" in St. Joseph's residency pro-
gram. Austin-area physicians formed the Foundation to operate the
residency program at Brackenridge Hospital, which is owned by the City
of Austin, and Dr. Harshaw was the Foundation's Director of Surgical
Education.238
The Wolff family sued various parties for the car wreck and the subse-
quent medical malpractice. The jury contributed 85% of the liability to
Dr. Villafani and found that St. Joseph was also liable under a joint-enter-
prise theory. St. Joseph appealed, claiming that there was no theory of
233, Id. (emphasis added).
234. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002).
235. Id. at 517.
236, Id.
237. Id. at 518-19.
238. Id. at 518.
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vicarious liability that could be used to sustain the verdict.239
The issue before the Texas Supreme Court was whether there was any
evidence to support a finding of vicarious liability. The court began by
looking at the relationship between Dr. Villafani, St. Joseph, and Brack-
enridge. Dr. Villafani's employment contract was with St. Joseph. St. Jo-
seph issued Dr. Villafani's paycheck, withholding taxes, social security,
and medicare, and reported his income to the IRS on a W-2.240 It also
allowed Dr. Villafani to participate in its employee benefits program. 241
The Foundation then reimbursed St. Joseph for the salary and benefits for
residents at Brackenridge. 242 The Foundation set Dr. Villafani's daily
work schedule, while St. Joseph set his vacation time and sick leave.
The contract between St. Joseph and the Foundation states that its pur-
pose is "to 'establish an Integrated General Surgery Residency Program
at Brackenridge Hospital, as an integral division of St. Joseph['s] General
Surgery Residency Program."' 243 It is common for residency programs to
be multi-institutional, yet the program director at the parent institution,
in this case St. Joseph, appoints all members of the teaching staff, the
teaching director, and the residents at each integrated institution.244 He
also determines the rotations and assignments of residents.245 The parent
institution also assumes final responsibility for the residents' education
and the quality of that education.246
The Foundation also had certain rights and responsibilities. The Foun-
dation appointed a Director of Surgical Education to supervise the re-
sidents while they were at Brackenridge. 247 This was Dr. Harshaw. The
Foundation also had the right to prior approval before St. Joseph as-
signed residents to Brackenridge. 248 The contract stated that the re-
sidents were to provide care under the supervision of the Foundation's
teaching staff and that each resident was directly responsible to the mem-
ber of the teaching staff to whom he or she was assigned by Dr. Har-
shaw.249 Dr. Harshaw was then responsible to St. Joseph for the quality
of the educational experience that the resident received at Bracken-
ridge.250 Separate and apart from a participating physician's responsibil-
ity to teach residents, attending physicians have "an ethical and a legal
responsibility for the overall care of the individual patient and for the
supervision of the resident involved in the care of that patient. '251
239. Id.
240. Id. at 524.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 521.
244. Id. at 520.
245. Id. at 521
246. Id.







Comment c to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 491 states: "The
elements which are essential to a joint enterprise are commonly stated to
be four: (1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the
group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a com-
munity of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and
(4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives
an equal right of control. '252 The court adopted the Restatement's defi-
nition of "joint enterprise" in Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler.253 Unlike
the Restatement, the trial court's charge defined the third element of
joint enterprise as the existence of "a common business or pecuniary in-
terest. '254 St. Joseph appealed, in part, based on an error in this charge.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with St. Joseph.
Comparing the charge's language ("common business or pecuniary
interest") with the Restatement's language (a "community of pecuni-
ary interest in [the common] purpose, among the members [of the
group]") confirms that the two phrases do not have the same mean-
ing. Moreover, the charge's wording is in the disjunctive, which
would permit the jury to find that the third element of the joint en-
terprise test was met after finding either a "common business inter-
est" or a "common pecuniary interest. '255
The court further noted that under the definition given by the trial court,
a franchisor and franchisee, or a wholesaler and a retailer, would satisfy
this element. These groups usually do not, however, have a "community
of pecuniary interest." And while wholesalers and franchisors benefit
from the downstream sales of the retailer and franchisee, "their interests
in those activities are not held in 'community' with members of the latter
group because they are not shared 'without special or distinguishing
characteristics.' "256
The court was also concerned that the definition given by the trial court
did not consider the way the elements interrelate. The elements all
center around a particular purpose shared by the members of the joint
enterprise, who must "(1) agree to a common purpose; (2) have a com-
munity of pecuniary interest in that common purpose; and (3) have an
equal right of control over the enterprise or project formed to carry out
that purpose." 257 This aspect of the joint enterprise doctrine is important
when there is a "complex, ongoing relationship between the members of
the claimed joint enterprise. '258 When such relationships exist between
the purported members of the joint enterprise, there could be several dif-
ferent agreements between the parties that encompass different purposes.
There may be a "community of interests" or "equal right to a voice in the
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 (1965).
253. Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974).
254. St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 527.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 528.
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 529.
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direction" of the enterprise as to some of these purposes, but not as to
others.259 Because the charge submitted by the trial court "did not re-
quire the purpose in which the parties have a community of pecuniary
interest to be the same as the purpose of the enterprise or project over
which the parties have an equal right of control," 260 the court sustained
this point of error.
The court next examined whether there was sufficient evidence of joint
enterprise under the proper definition of joint enterprise. The court in-
terpreted the purpose of the agreement between the Foundation and St.
Joseph as "operating the general surgery residency program at Bracken-
ridge Hospital" and found that there was no "community of pecuniary
interest for that purpose. '261
To satisfy the third element, there must be a common monetary inter-
est "shared without special or distinguishing characteristics." St. Joseph
did not share with the Foundation any money it received from Medicare
based on the number of residents in the program. The Foundation did
not share with St. Joseph any money it received from the City of Austin,
government assistance programs, or third-party payors. And although
the Foundation reimbursed St. Joseph for residents' salaries and benefits,
there was no evidence this obligation was related to the fees generated by
the residents. The court therefore concluded that there was no evidence
of a common pecuniary interest.
The court next considered whether there was a "common purpose be-
tween St. Joseph and the Foundation to provide patient care at Bracken-
ridge Hospital. '262 The court stated that "the most critical evidence is
that the parties did not share any income from the residency program's
operations at Brackenridge. ' '263 Based on the court's prior discussion,
however, the most critical evidence may be that the common purpose of
the residency program was to train surgeons - not provide medical care
to patients. Since the court found "no evidence of such an interest in any
of the possible common purposes between St. Joseph and the Founda-
tion," it rendered judgment that the Wolffs take nothing against St. Jo-
seph under a joint enterprise theory. 264
The court then examined the joint venture, ratification, respondeat su-
perior liability outside the employment context, and the borrowed ser-
vant doctrine.
The jury found that St. Joseph and the Foundation were engaged in a
joint venture. There is a joint venture "if the persons or entities con-
cerned have (1) a community of interest in the venture; (2) an agreement
to share profits; (3) an agreement to share losses; and (4) a mutual right
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 531, 534.





of control or management of the venture. ' 265 Since there was no evi-
dence that St. Joseph and the Foundation had agreed to share profits,
there was no joint venture.
"Even if a principal was unaware of its agent's unauthorized action, it
may ratify that action and thus become liable for it if the principal retains
the benefits of the action after acquiring full knowledge of the unautho-
rized conduct. ' 266 The court concluded that there was no evidence St.
Joseph expressly ratified Dr. Villafani's treatment of Wolff, or that St.
Joseph impliedly ratified Dr. Villafani's conduct "by receiving and retain-
ing any benefits that may have resulted from Dr. Villafani's treatment of
Wolff. '267 St. Joseph did not receive any portion of the fees from Wolff's
treatment or any other patient at Brackenridge.
The jury also found St. Joseph liable under a theory of respondeat supe-
rior liability outside the employment context. The elements of this theory
are (1) benefit to the defendant and (2) right of control.268 But St. Jo-
seph's residency program did not receive benefit from Dr. Villafani's
treatment of Wolff, there could be no respondeat superior liability.
The court last addressed the issue of the borrowed servant doctrine.
Under this doctrine, "a general or regular employee of one employer may
become the borrowed employee of another with respect to some activi-
ties. '269 Liability shifts when "the other employer or its agents have the
right to direct and control the employee with respect to the details of the
particular work at issue. '270
While St. Joseph had ultimate responsibility for Dr. Villafani's educa-
tion, the Foundation controlled the details of patient care at Bracken-
ridge Hospital. The attending physicians and senior residents supervised
Dr. Villafani's work. Dr. Harshaw, the Director of Surgical Education,
was responsible for the residents' specific training assignments. Further-
more, the Program Contract provided that St. Joseph would "not control
the details of the medical tasks performed by the residents when they are
assigned to CTMF [the Foundation] save through consultation between
and the mutual consent of the Academic Chief of General Surgery at St.
Joseph Hospital and CTMF's Director of Surgical Education."' 271 Thus,
the court concluded, "regardless of any evidence that Villafani was the
general or regular employee of St. Joseph, he was acting as the borrowed
employee of the Foundation as a matter of law when he treated Wolff. '272
This analysis is thorough, logical, and defensible in every respect.
265. Id. at 535 (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex.
1997)).
266. Id. at 536.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 537.
269. Id. (citing Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. 1977); Produc-
ers Chem. Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Tex. 1963)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 543.




In Limestone Products Distribution, Inc. v. McNamara,273 the wife of
Tom McNamara, who was killed when his motorcycle was hit by Coy
Mathis's car, sued Mathis's employer, Limestone Products Distribution.
When Mathis hit McNamara, he was driving to a Limestone job site to
deliver load tickets so that Limestone could bill its customers. The trial
court held that because the driver was an independent contractor, the
employer was not liable in the survivors' personal injury action. The ap-
pellate court agreed, but on rehearing reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment. The Texas Supreme Court, in a per curium opinion,
held that while the appellate court correctly identified the legal test for
determining independent-contractor status as right to control, it incor-
rectly applied the test to the facts.274
The test for "whether a worker is an employee rather than an indepen-
dent contractor is whether the employer has the right to control the pro-
gress, details, and methods of operations of the work. '275 When
analyzing the degree of control, Texas courts should consider:
(1) the independent nature of the worker's business;
(2) the worker's obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and
materials to perform the job;
(3) the worker's right to control the progress of the work except about
final results;
(4) the time for which the worker is employed; and
(5) the method of payment, whether by unit of time or by the job.276
Mathis owned his truck and was free to choose his route when making
deliveries. 277 He paid for his own gasoline, repairs, and insurance.278
Limestone did not supply Mathis with any tools or equipment. Limes-
tone paid Mathis with eighty percent of the income from each load he
delivered, and he received no pay if there was no work. Limestone re-
ported Mathis's income on a 1099 form, and Mathis paid his own social
security and federal income taxes. 279 The court stated that while "some
of these factors may not, alone, be enough to demonstrate a worker's
independent-contractor status, together they provide conclusive sum-
mary-judgment evidence that Mathis was an independent contractor and
not Limestone's employee when the accident occurred. '280
273. Limestone Prods. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2002).
274. Id. at 312.
275. Id. at 312 (citing Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 789 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.
1990); Farrell v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 908 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied)).
276. Id. at 312.
277. Id. at 310.
278. Id.
279. Id.




In Shah v. Moss, 281 Dr. Harshad Shah contended that the Medical Lia-
bility and Insurance Improvement Act ("MLIIA") barred Ronald Moss's
claims that Dr. Shah negligently performed surgery on Moss's right eye
and then negligently failed to provide follow-up care.282
On May 1991, Moss saw Dr. Shah for a detached retina in Moss's right
eye.283 In June 1991, Dr. Shah surgically implanted a sclera buckle to
secure Moss's retina. Moss continued to have vision problems, but Dr.
Shah warned that removing the sclera buckle could lead to another reti-
nal detachment. Dr. Shah finally removed the sclera buckle in November
1992 on the recommendation of a specialist. From November 1992 to
October 1993, Dr. Shah conducted five post-surgery "rechecks." More
than a year later in November 1994, Moss saw Dr. Shah for a "yearly
exam," where he reported a "new floater" in his vision. Dr. Shah discov-
ered that Moss's retina was detached and repaired the second detached
retina in December 1994.284 After this procedure, Moss continued to
have blurred vision. After several other procedures, including cataract
surgery, Moss lost sight in his right eye.285 Moss saw Dr. Shah for the last
time in July 1995, and Dr. Shah said that could do nothing more to im-
prove Moss's vision.
Moss sued Dr. Shah in June 1996. In his petition, Moss claimed Dr.
Shah negligently removed the sclera buckle in November 1992 and that
Dr. Shah failed to adequately monitor Moss's eye following the surgery.
The trial court granted Dr. Shah summary judgment on limitations.
On appeal, Moss also argued that "his claims [were] not time-barred
because Dr. Shah engaged in a negligent course of treatment for Moss's
eye problem that continued until his last office visit on July 24, 1995."286
He also argued that Dr. Shah was not entitled to summary judgment on
Moss's fraudulent concealment claim because Dr. Shah's summary judg-
ment motion did not discuss the issue. 287
Under Article 4590i section 10.01, the limitations period for medical
negligence claims begins to run from one of three dates: "(1) the occur-
rence of the breach or tort, (2) the last date of the relevant course of
treatment, or (3) the last date of the relevant hospitalization. '288 In
Husain v. Khatib, the Texas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not
simply choose the most favorable date within the three categories.289 If
the date of the alleged tort is ascertainable, limitations runs from that
281. Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836 (Tex. 2002).
282. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i.
283. Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 839.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 840.
287. Id. at 841.
288. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4590i, § 10.01; Husain v. Khatib, 964 S.W.2d 918, 919
(Tex. 1998).
289. Husain, 964 S.W.2d at 919.
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date,2 90 and there is no need to examine the second and third
categories. 291
The second category was obviously critical in Moss's case. The court
noted that it contemplates a situation "wherein the patient's injury occurs
during a course of treatment for a particular condition and the only read-
ily ascertainable date is the last day of treatment. 2 92 Since the second
retinal detachment occurred some time between the November 1992 sur-
gery and Moss's yearly exam in November 1994, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the tort date was unascertainable and held that the statute of
limitations began to run on the last day of the course of treatment.293
Moss also alleged, however, that the surgery to remove the sclera buckle
was performed negligently. The date of that procedure was known-No-
vember 28, 1992. Thus, limitations began to run on that date, and the
negligent surgery claim was clearly barred by limitations.
The issue of the allegedly negligent follow-up treatment was more diffi-
cult. The court noted that Moss's experts had stated that Dr. Shah should
have provided follow-up treatment on a weekly or monthly basis after he
removed the sclera buckle in November 1992.294 The majority therefore
concluded that "limitations began to run each time Dr. Shah saw Moss,
beginning with the first post-surgery visit in November 1992" because "he
breached the alleged duty to provide weekly or monthly follow-up treat-
ment on every date he actually saw Moss. '295 The majority found that
the statute began to run "the last date Dr. Shah could have ordered addi-
tional weekly or monthly office visits," which was the date of the last
recheck visit in October 1993.296 Since Moss did not file suit until June
1996, this claim was barred as well.
As Justice O'Neill points out in the dissent, Moss's retina did not be-
come re-detached until some time after his last "recheck." The re-de-
tachment of his retina is the injury that Moss alleged was caused by the
negligent failure to provide proper follow-up treatment. Therefore, "lim-
itations began to run on Moss's claim before he suffered an injury. '297
A cause of action does not accrue until all elements are present-duty,
breach, causation, and damages. Since the date on which Moss's retina
became re-detached was not clear, the date of the tort was not readily
ascertainable, and limitations should have began to run from the date
that the course of treatment was completed. The dissenting justices
found that Dr. Shah had not proven as a matter of law that the course of
treatment ended with the last "recheck" and summary judgment was
290. Id. at 919; Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882 886 (Tex. 1999).
291. Husain, 964 S.W.2d at 919; Kimball v. Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1987).
292. Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 841 (quoting Kimball, 741 S.W.2d at 372).
293. Id. at 842.
294. Id. at 839.
295. Id. at 844.
296. Id. at 844-45.
297. Id. at 848 (O'Neill, J., dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
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therefore improper.2 98 Dr. Moss's expert had testified that Dr. Shah's
entire course of treatment was improper - from the date of the first
surgery in May 1991 to the date of the last visit in 1995.
The dissent also took issue with the majority's review standard. The
court stated that it should resolve all factual disputes in the non-movant's
favor.299 The majority nevertheless states: "Moss's medical records
demonstrate that Moss's last 'recheck' visit was on October 23, 1993, and
Dr. Shah did not diagnose the second detached retina until Moss visited
Dr. Shah more than twelve months later on November 22, 1994." 300 De-
spite the label placed on these visits, there was a substantial amount of
evidence that they were all part of a single course of treatment: (1) Moss
was referred to Dr. Shah for treatment of his retinal condition; (2) the
buckle-removal and any necessary follow-up treatment related to that
condition; (3) Moss saw other experts about different eye problems; (4)
Dr. Shah only saw Moss for the retinal condition; and (5) Dr. Shah's
notes from the October 1993 exam state that the condition needs to be
rechecked in one year. The majority somehow concluded that the No-
vember 1994 re-check was totally unrelated. That seems completely illog-
ical considering the evidence and the court's obligation to resolve all
factual disputes in the non-movant's favor, but they had to make that
assumption to reverse and render for the physician and, as a conse-
quence, for the legions of future physicians providing negligent follow-up
care as part of a single course of treatment.
CONCLUSION
Texas courts have once again enjoyed a banner year eliminating the
number of personal torts capable of being committed in Texas. Fewer
duties apparently means fewer victims, as a person harmed by another
who owed him or her no duty simply suffered an "unfortunate result" or
an "accident" instead of being actually injured by the unreasonable and
careless conduct of another. The primary exceptions to this wave of duty
elimination are cases involving murderers and strip clubs. With fewer
torts, all Texans should sleep better knowing that they are "safe" from
careless doctors, defective product manufacturers and the owners of dan-
gerous premises because Texas courts have determined that it is no longer
possible for many of these persons and entities to commit personal torts.
We progress toward the elimination of a general duty to act reasonably
and carefully.
298. Id. at 851.
299. Id. at 850.
300. Id. at 845.
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